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Abstract
The word proposition is used in physics with different meanings, which
must be distinguished to avoid interpretational problems. We construct
two languages L∗(x) and L(x) with classical set-theoretical semantics
which allow us to illustrate those meanings and to show that the non-
Boolean lattice of propositions of quantum logic (QL) can be obtained
by selecting a subset of p-testable propositions within the Boolean lattice
of all propositions associated with sentences of L(x). Yet, the aforesaid
semantics is incompatible with the standard interpretation of quantum
mechanics (QM) because of known no-go theorems. But if one accepts
our criticism of these theorems and the ensuing SR (semantic realism)
interpretation of QM, the incompatibility disappears, and the classical
and quantum notions of truth can coexist, since they refer to different
metalinguistic concepts (truth and verifiability according to QM, respec-
tively). Moreover one can construct a quantum language LTQ(x) whose
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra is isomorphic to QL, the sentences of which
state (testable) properties of individual samples of physical systems, while
standard QL does not bear this interpretation.
1 Introduction
The word proposition has been used in physics with some different meanings.
Jauch (1968) intended it simply as a synonim of yes-no experiment, Piron (1976)
denoted by it an equivalence class of questions, etc., following a tradition started
by Birkhoff and von Neumann (1936) with their experimental propositions. On
the other hand, the same term is also used in order to denote the (closed)
set of states associated with an experimental proposition, often called physical
proposition (see, e.g., Dalla Chiara et al., 2004, Introduction to Part I). The
latter use is commonly preferred by those logicians concerned with quantum
logic (QL) who identify states with possible worlds (ibid., Ch. 8). For, an
experimental proposition can be considered as a sentence of a physical language,
and the set of states associated with it as its proposition in a standard logical
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sense. However, the term proposition is also used to denote an element of the
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of the aforesaid physical language (see, e.g., Re´dei,
1998, Ch. 5; the links between the two meanings are rather obvious).
Let us adopt from now on the standard logical meaning of the term propo-
sition, accepting to identify physical states with possible worlds (which may be
questioned from several viewpoints; we, however, do not want to discuss this
topic in the present paper). Then, a serious problem occurs when dealing with
quantum mechanics (QM), hence with QL. Indeed, every Birkhoff and von Neu-
mann’s experimental proposition can be experimentally confirmed or refuted
(see also Jammer, 1974, Ch. 8), so that it can be interpreted as a sentence α
of an observative language, stating a physical property that can be tested on
one or more individual samples of a given physical system (physical objects). In
classical mechanics (CM) a truth value is defined for every (atomic or molecu-
lar) sentence α, and the physical proposition pα of α (meant as a set of states
in which α is true) is introduced basing on this definition. On the contrary, it
can occur in QM that no truth value can be defined for a sentence α because
of nonobjectivity of properties (equivalently, the distinction between actual and
potential properties), which is a well known and debated feature of this theory
(see, e.g., Busch et al., 1991, Ch. II; Mermin, 1993). Indeed, nonobjectivity
prohibits one to associate a physical property E with a set of physical objects
possessing E, which is a basic step if one wants to construct a classical set-
theoretical semantics. Hence, a physical proposition is directly associated, in
QM, with α, whose truth value is defined via the proposition itself. This gives
rise to a number of difficulties, since the notion of truth introduced in this way
has several odd features. For instance, if a sentence is not true in a possible
world (state), one cannot assert that it is false in that state, and the join of two
sentences may be true even if none of the sentences is true. More important,
this notion of truth clashes with the fact that every (elementary) experimental
proposition can be checked on a physical object, yielding one of two values (0
or 1) that can be intuitively interpreted as true and false. Thus, the identifi-
cation of sentences with their propositions may produce serious troubles (the
“metaphysical disaster” pointed out, though in a somewhat different way, by
Foulis and Randall, 1983). According to Dalla Chiara et al. (2004, Ch. 1) this
problem stimulated the investigation about more and more general quantum
structures. In our opinion, however, the attempt at solving it in this way is
questionable. Indeed, the problem is originated by some specific features of the
standard interpretation of the mathematical formalism of QM (to be precise, the
aforesaid nonobjectivity of properties) and not by the formalism itself, so that
it cannot be solved by simply generalizing the mathematical apparatus without
removing those peculiarities of the interpretation that create it (see also Busch
and Shimony, 1996).
According to a widespread belief, the impossibility of solving the above prob-
lem by firstly endowing the language of QM with a classical set-theoretical se-
mantics and then introducing the set of propositions is witnessed by the fact
that this set has a structure of orthomodular nondistributive lattice, while a
classical semantics would lead to a Boolean lattice of propositions.
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We aim to show in this paper that the above belief is ill-founded. To be
precise, we want to show that one can construct a simple language L(x) endowed
with a classical set-theoretical semantics, associate it with a poset of physical
propositions (that generally is not a lattice), and then introduce a definition of
testability on L(x) which selects a subposet of testable (actually, p-testable, see
Sec. 3) physical propositions. Our procedure is very intuitive, and applies to
every theory, as CM and QM, in which physical objects and properties can be
defined. Under reasonable physical assumptions the poset of all testable physical
propositions turns out to be a Boolean lattice in CM, while it is an orthomodular
nondistributive lattice in QM that can be identified with a (standard, sharp)
QL. It follows, in particular, that nondistributivity cannot be considered an
evidence that a classical notion of truth cannot be introduced in QM.
Our result does not prove, of course, that providing a classical semantics
for the observative language of QM is actually possible. Indeed, nonobjectivity
of properties would still forbid it. However, should one accept the criticism
to nonobjectivity provided by ourselves in some previous paper, and the Se-
mantic Realism (SR) interpretation of QM following from it (see Garola and
Solombrino, 1996a, 1996b; Garola 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005; Garola and Pykacz,
2004),1 the language L(x) introduced in this paper appears as a sublanguage
of the broader observative language of QM, and the classical set-theoretical
semantics defined on it can be seen as a restriction of the broader classical
set-theoretical semantics that can be defined on the observative language. If
this viewpoint is accepted, the distinction between physical propositions and
testable physical propositions can be considered something more than an ab-
stract scheme for showing how non-Boolean algebras can be recovered within
a Boolean framework. Indeed, physical propositions are then associated in a
standard way with (universally) quantified sentences of L(x) that have classical
truth values, which avoids the “metaphysical disaster” mentioned above, and
testable physical propositions are physical propositions associated with quan-
tified sentences for which truth criteria are given that allow one to determine
1We remind that our criticism is based on an epistemological perspective according to which
the theoretical laws of any physical theory are considered as mathematical schemes from which
empirical laws can be deduced. The latter laws are assumed to be valid in all those physical
situations in which they can be experimentally checked, while no assumption of validity can
be done in physical situations in which some general principle prohibits one to check them
(this position is consistent, in particular, with the operational and antimetaphysical attitude
of standard QM). In CM our perspective does not introduce any substantial change, since
there is no physical situation in which an empirical law cannot, in principle, be tested. On
the contrary, if boundary, or initial, conditions are given in QM in which properties that
are not compatible are attributed to the physical system (more precisely, to a sample of
it), a physical situation is hypothesized that cannnot be empirically accessible, hence no
assumption of validity can be done for the empirical laws deduced from the general formalism
of QM in this situation. Strangely enough, this new perspective is sufficient to invalidate
the proof of some important no-go theorems, as Bell’s (Bell, 1964) and Bell-Kochen-Specker’s
(Bell, 1966; Kochen and Specker, 1967). Nonobjectivity of properties then appears in this
context as an interpretative choice, not a logical consequence of the theory, and alternative
interpretations become possible. Among these, our SR interpretation restores objectivity of
properties without requiring any change in the mathematical apparatus and in the minimal
(statistical) interpretation of QM.
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empirically their truth values.2
The lattice operations on the lattice of all testable physical propositions,
however, only partially correspond to logical operations of L(x) in QM. We
show that L(x) can be enriched by introducing new quantum connectives, so
that a language LTQ(x) of testable sentences can be extracted from L(x) whose
Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra is isomorphic to the orthomodular lattice of all
testable physical propositions of L(x). Thus, we introduce a clear distinction be-
tween classical and quantum connectives, and show that a verificationist notion
of quantum truth can be defined on LTQ(x) which coexists with the classical
definition of truth, rather than being alternative to it. This is a noticeable
achievement, which avoids postulating that different incompatible notions of
truth are implicitly introduced by our physical reasonings.
Some of the results resumed above have already been expounded in some
previous papers (Garola and Sozzo, 2004, 2006), though in a somewhat differ-
ent form. Here we generalize our previous treatments by considering effects in
place of properties, which leads us to preliminarily construct a broader language
L∗(x) in which L(x) is embedded. An interesting consequence of this broader
perspective is a weakening of the notion of testability, which illustrates from our
present viewpoint a possible advantage of unsharp QM with respect to standard
QM. We also provide a simple new way for defining physical propositions by in-
troducing universal quantifiers on the sentences of the language L∗(x), which
also helps in better understanding the notion of quantum truth and its differ-
ence from classical truth. For the sake of brevity, however, our presentation is
very schematic and essential.
It remains to observe that a more general treatment of the topics discussed
in this paper could be done by adopting the formalization of an observative sub-
language of QM introduced by ourselves many years ago (Garola, 1991). In this
case, two classes of predicates would occur, one denoting effects (hence proper-
ties), one denoting states, so that states would not be identified with possible
worlds and physical propositions would be distinguished from propositions in
a standard logical sense. This treatment would be more general and formally
complete, at the expense, however, of simplicity and understandability, so that
we do not undertake this task here.
2 The language of effects L∗(x)
We callL∗(x) the formal language constructed by means of the following symbols
and rules.
Alphabet.
An individual variable x.
Monadic predicates E, F , ....
Logical connectives ¬, ∧, ∨.
2From a logical viewpoint our treatment exhibits the deep reasons of the “disaster”. Indeed,
experimental propositions are interpreted as open sentences of a first order predicate language,
while physical propositions are associated with quantified sentences of the same language.
4
Auxiliary signs (, ).
Syntaxis.
Standard classical formation rules for well formed formulas (briefly, wffs).
We introduce a set-theoretical semantics on L∗(x) by means of the following
metalinguistic symbols, sets and rules.
E∗: the set of all predicates.
Φ∗(x): the set of all wffs of L∗(x).
E∗(x): the set {E(x) | E ∈ E∗} of all elementary wffs of L∗(x).
A set S of states.
For every S ∈ S, a universe US of physical objects.
A setR of mappings (interpretations) such that, for every ρ ∈ R, ρ : (x, S) ∈
{x} × S −→ ρS(x) ∈ US .
For every S∈ S and E ∈ E∗, an extension extS(E) ⊆ US .
For every ρ ∈ R and S ∈ S, a classical assignment function σρS : Φ
∗(x) −→
{t, f} (where t stands for true and f for false), defined according to standard
(recursive) truth rules in Tarskian semantics (to be precise, for every elementary
wff E(x) ∈ E∗(x), σρS(E(x)) = t iff ρS(x) ∈ extS(E), for every pair α(x), β(x)
of wffs of Φ∗(x), σρS(α(x) ∧ β(x)) = t iff σ
ρ
S(α(x)) = t = σ
ρ
S(β(x)), etc.).
The intended physical interpretation of L∗(x) can then be summarized as
follows.
Reference to a physical system Σ is understood.
A predicate of L∗(x) denotes an effect, which is operationally interpreted
as an equivalence class of (dichotomic) registering devices, each of which, when
activated by an individual sample of Σ, performs a registration that may yield
value 0 or 1 (see, e.g., Ludwig, 1983, Ch. II; Garola and Solombrino, 1996). We
assume in the following that every registering device belongs to an effect.
A state is operationally interpreted as an equivalence class of preparing de-
vices, each of which, when activated, performs a preparation of an individual
sample of Σ (ibid.).
A physical object is operationally interpreted as an individual sample of Σ,
which can be identified with a preparation (ibid.).
The equation σρS(E(x)) = t (or f) is interpreted as meaning that, if a reg-
istering device belonging to E is activated by the physical object ρS(x), the
result of the registration is 1 (0). The interpretation of σρS(α(x)) = t (or f),
with α(x) ∈ Φ∗(x), follows in an obvious way, bearing in mind the above truth
rules for the connectives ¬,∧,∨.
Let us now introduce some further definitions and notions.
(i) We define a logical preorder < and a logical equivalence ≡ on Φ∗(x) in a
standard way, as follows.
Let α(x), β(x) ∈ Φ∗(x). Then,
α(x) < β(x) iff for every ρ ∈ R and S ∈ S, σρS(α(x)) = t implies
σρS(β(x)) = t,
α(x) ≡ β(x) iff α(x) < β(x) and β(x) < α(x).
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We note that the quotient set Φ∗(x)/ ≡ is partially ordered by the order
(still denoted by <) canonically induced on it by the preorder <. It easy to
prove that the poset (Φ∗(x)/ ≡, <) is a Boolean lattice.
(ii) Let α(x) ∈ Φ∗(x). We call physical sentence associated with α(x) the
(universally) quantified sentence (∀x)α(x), and denote by Ψ∗ the set of all phys-
ical sentences associated with wffs of L∗(x) (hence Ψ∗ = {(∀x)α(x) | α(x) ∈
Φ∗(x)}). Then, for every S ∈ S, we introduce a classical assignment function
σS : Ψ
∗ −→ {t, f} by setting, for every physical sentence (∀x)α(x) ∈ Ψ∗,
σS((∀x)α(x)) = t iff for every ρ ∈ R, σ
ρ
S(α(x)) = t.
The logical preorder and equivalence defined on Φ∗(x) can be extended to
Ψ∗ in a standard way, as follows.
Let (∀x)α(x), (∀x)β(x) ∈ Ψ∗. Then,
(∀x)α(x) < (∀x)β(x) iff for every S ∈ S, σS((∀x)α(x)) = t implies
σS((∀x)β(x)) = t,
(∀x)α(x) ≡ (∀x)β(x) iff (∀x)α(x) < (∀x)β(x) and (∀x)β(x) < (∀x)α(x).
The quotient set Ψ∗/ ≡ is partially ordered by the order (still denoted by
<) canonically induced on it by the preorder <, but the poset (Ψ∗/ ≡, <) is not
bound to be a lattice.
(iii) We use the definitions in (ii) to introduce a notion of true with certainty
on Φ∗(x). For every α(x) ∈ Φ∗(x) and S ∈ S, we put
α(x) is certainly true in S iff σS((∀x)α(x)) = t (equivalently, the physical
sentence (∀x)α(x)) associated with α(x) is true).
A wff α(x) ∈ Φ∗(x) can be certainly true in the state S or not. It must be
stressed that in the latter case we do not say that α(x) is certainly false in S:
this term will be introduced indeed at a later stage,with a different meaning.
We also note explicitly that the new truth value is attributed or not to a wff of
Φ∗(x) independently of the interpretation ρ.
The notion of true with certainty allows one to introduce a physical preorder
≺ and a physical equivalence ≈ on Φ∗(x), as follows.
Let α(x), β(x) ∈ Φ∗(x). Then,
α(x) ≺ β(x) iff for every S ∈ S, α(x) is certainly true in S implies that
β(x) is certainly true in S (equivalently, (∀x)α(x)) < (∀x)β(x)).
α(x) ≈ β(x) iff α(x) ≺ β(x) and β(x) ≺ α(x) (equivalently, (∀x)α(x) ≡
(∀x)β(x)).
It is apparent that the logical preorder < and the logical equivalence ≡ on
Φ∗(x) imply the physical preorder ≺ and the physical equivalence ≈, respec-
tively, while the converse implications generally do not hold. Moreover, one
can introduce the quotient set Φ∗(x)/ ≈, partially ordered by the order (still
denoted by ≺) canonically induced on it by the preorder ≺ defined on Φ∗(x).
Then, the posets (Φ∗(x)/ ≈,≺) and (Ψ∗/ ≡, <) are obviously order-isomorphic.
(iv) We want to introduce a concept of testability on Φ∗(x). To this end, let
us consider an elementary wff E(x) ∈ Φ∗(x) and observe that it is testable in
the sense that its truth value for a given interpretation ρ and state S can be
empirically checked by using one of the registering devices in the class denoted by
E in order to perform a registration on ρS(x). Let us consider now a molecular
wff α(x) of Φ∗(x) and agree that it is testable iff a registering device exists that
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allows us to check its truth value. Since we have assumed that every registering
device belongs to an effect, we conclude that α(x) is testable iff it is logically
equivalent to an elementary wff of Φ∗(x). Thus, we introduce the subset Φ∗T (x)
of all testable wffs of Φ∗(x), defined as follows.
Φ∗T (x) = {α(x) ∈ Φ
∗(x) | ∃Eα ∈ E
∗ : α(x) ≡ Eα(x)}.
Of course, the binary relations <, ≡, ≺ and ≈ introduced on Φ∗(x) can be
restricted to Φ∗T (x), and we still denote these restrictions by the symbols <, ≡,
≺ and ≈, respectively, in the following.
(v) The notion of testability can be extended to the physical sentences as-
sociated with wffs of Φ∗(x) by setting, for every α(x) ∈ Φ∗(x),
(∀x)α(x) is testable iff α(x) is testable (equivalently, α(x) ∈ Φ∗T (x)).
We denote the set of all testable physical sentences by Ψ∗T (hence, Ψ
∗
T =
{(∀x)α(x) | α(x) ∈ Φ∗T (x)}), and still denote the restrictions to Ψ
∗
T of the binary
relations < and ≡ defined on Ψ∗ by < and ≡, respectively. It is then easy to
show that the posets (Φ∗T (x)/ ≈,≺) and (Ψ
∗
T / ≡, <) are order-isomorphic.
3 Physical propositions
Let α(x) ∈ Φ∗(x). We put
pfα = {S ∈ S |α(x) is certainly true in S},
and say that pfα is the physical proposition associated with α(x) (or, briefly, the
physical proposition of α(x)). It is then easy to see that pfα is the proposition as-
sociated with (∀x)α(x) according to the standard rules of a Kripkean semantics
in which states play the role of possible worlds. More formally,
pfα = {S ∈ S |σS((∀x)α(x)) = t} = {S ∈ S |for every ρ ∈ R, σ
ρ
S(α(x)) = t}.
We denote by P∗f the set of all physical propositions of wffs of Φ∗(x),
P∗f = {pfα | α(x) ∈ Φ
∗(x)}.
The definitions of certainly true in S, physical order ≺ and physical equiva-
lence ≈ can be restated by using the notion of physical proposition. Indeed, for
every α(x), β(x) ∈ Φ∗(x),
α(x) is certainly true in S iff S ∈ pfα,
α(x) ≺ β(x) iff pfα ⊆ p
f
β,
α(x) ≈ β(x) iff pfα = p
f
β.
The above results imply that the posets (Φ∗(x)/ ≈,≺) (or (Ψ∗/ ≡, <)) and
(P∗f ,⊆) are order-isomorphic.3 However, the set-theoretical operations on P∗f
do not generally correspond to logical operations on Φ∗(x). Indeed, for every
α(x), β(x), γ(x) ∈ Φ∗(x), one gets
α(x) ≡ ¬β(x) implies pfα ⊆ S\p
f
β ,
α(x) ≡ β(x) ∧ γ(x) implies pfα = p
f
β ∩ p
f
γ ,
3This isomorphism suggests that one could introduce the notion of true with certainty by
firstly assigning (P∗f ,⊆) with its algebraic structure and then connecting it with Φ∗(x), thus
providing an algebraic semantics which allows one to avoid the definition introduced in Sec. 2,
hence the introduction of a classical truth theory. One would thus follow standard procedures
in QL, yet losing the links between two different notions of truth illustrated in this paper.
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α(x) ≡ β(x) ∨ γ(x) implies pfα ⊇ p
f
β ∪ p
f
γ
(see also Garola and Sozzo, 2006).
Let us consider now the subset Φ∗T (x) of all testable wffs of Φ
∗(x) introduced
in Sec. 2. We define the subset P∗fT ⊆ P
∗fof all testable physical propositions
by setting
P∗fT = {p
f
α | α(x) ∈ Φ
∗
T (x)}.
Then, one gets that P∗fT coincides with the set of all physical propositions
associated with elementary wffs of Φ∗(x). Moreover, the posets (Φ∗T (x)/ ≈,≺)
(or (Ψ∗T / ≡, <)) and (P
∗f
T ,⊆) are order-isomorphic.
4 The language of properties L(x)
Both in CM and in QM the set of all effects contains a subset of decision effects
(see, e.g., Ludwig, 1983, Ch. III) that we briefly call properties in this paper.
Hence the set E∗ of all predicates of L∗(x) contains a subset E of predicates
denoting properties. Therefore one can consider the sublanguage L(x) of L∗(x)
constructed by using only predicates in E and following the procedures summa-
rized in Sec. 2. Thus, the set of all wffs of L(x), the set of all elementary wffs of
L(x), the semantics and the physical interpretation of L(x), the logical preorder
and equivalence on L(x), etc., are defined as in Sec. 2, simply dropping the
suffix ∗. Hence one obtains that the poset (Φ(x)/ ≡, <) is a Boolean lattice and
that the posets (Φ(x)/ ≈,≺) and (Ψ/ ≡, <) are order-isomorphic. Moreover,
the set ΦT (x) of all testable wffs of L(x) is defined as follows,
ΦT (x) = {α(x) ∈ Φ(x) | ∃Eα ∈ E : α(x) ≡ Eα(x)},
and the posets (ΦT (x)/ ≈,≺) and (ΨT / ≡, <) are order-isomorphic. It must
be noted, however, that the notion of testability introduced in this way on
Φ(x) does not coincide with the notion of testability following from the general
definition in Sec. 2. Indeed, according to the latter, the set of all testable wffs
of Φ(x) would be given by
Φ′T (x) = {α(x) ∈ Φ(x) | ∃Eα ∈ E
∗ : α(x) ≡ Eα(x)},
which implies ΦT (x) ⊆ Φ′T (x), so that ΦT (x) and Φ
′
T (x) cannot, in general, be
identified. Therefore we call p-testability the more restrictive notion of testabil-
ity introduced here. We notice that the broadening of the set of testable wffs
of Φ(x) following from considering the language of effects illustrates from our
present viewpoint one of the known advantages of unsharp QM with respect
to standard QM. Exploring this topic goes, however, beyond the scopes of the
present paper.
Let us come now to propositions. The set Pf of all physical propositions
associated with wffs of Φ(x) can be defined as in Sec. 3, replacing Φ∗(x) by Φ(x).
Again, no change is required, but dropping the suffix ∗. Hence, proceeding as in
Sec. 3, one can show that the posets (Φ(x)/ ≈,≺) (or (Ψ/ ≡, <)) and (Pf ,⊆)
are order-isomorphic. One can then introduce the subset
PfT = {p
f
α ∈ P
f | α(x) ∈ ΦT (x)} ⊆ Pf
of all p-testable physical propositions and the subset
Pf ′T = {p
f
α ∈ P
f | α(x) ∈ Φ′T (x)} ⊆ P
f
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of all testable physical propositions (with PfT ⊆ P
f ′
T ). The distinction between
PfT and P
f ′
T is relevant in principle. However, we are only concerned with the
subset PfT in the following. One easily gets, proceeding as in Sec. 3, that P
f
T
coincides with the set of all physical propositions associated with elementary
wffs of Φ(x), and that the posets (ΦT (x)/ ≈,≺) (or (ΨT / ≡, <)) and (P
f
T ,⊆)
are order-isomorphic.
5 Physical propositions in classical mechanics
One can consider specific physical theories within the general scheme worked out
in Secs. 2-4 by inserting in it suitable assumptions suggested by the intended
interpretation in Sec. 2. In the case of CM, this leads to the collapse of a number
of notions, which explains why some relevant conceptual differences have been
overlooked in classical physics. Let us discuss briefly this issue.
First of all, all physical objects in a given state S possess the same properties
according to CM. This feature can be formalized by introducing the following
assumption.
CMS. The set E of all properties is such that, for every E ∈ E and S ∈ S,
either extSE = US or extSE = ∅.
Let us consider the language L(x) in CM. Because of axiom CMS, the re-
striction of the assigment function σρS to Φ(x) does not depend on ρ, hence for
every state S the wff α(x) is true iff the physical sentence (∀x)α(x) associated
with it is true. Thus, the notions of true and certainly true coincide on Φ(x).
Hence, the logical preorder and equivalence on Φ(x) can be identified with the
physical preorder and equivalence, respectively, so that the posets (Φ(x)/ ≈,≺)
and (Ψ/ ≡, <) can be identified with the Boolean lattice (Φ(x)/ ≡, <). Fur-
thermore, all these posets are order-isomorphic to (Pf ,⊆), which therefore is a
Boolean lattice.
Secondly, let us consider p-testability. It is well known that, in principle,
CM assumes that all properties can be simultaneously tested. This suggests one
to introduce a further assumption, as follows.
CMT. The set ΦT (x) of all p-testable wffs of Φ(x) coincides with Φ(x).
The above assumption implies ΨT = Ψ and P
f
T = P
f . Hence, (PfT ,⊆) is
a Boolean lattice, which explains the common statement that “the logic of a
classical mechanical system is a classical propositional logic” (Re´dei, 1998, Ch.
5). However, this statement can be misleading, since it ignores a number of
conceptual distinctions that we have pointed out in our general framework.
6 Physical propositions in quantum mechanics
Assumption CMS does not hold in (standard, Hilbert space) QM. Indeed, if
E denotes a property and S a state of the physical system Σ, the probability
of getting result 1 (or 0) when performing a registration by means of a device
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belonging to E on a sample of Σ may be different both from 0 and from 1 in
QM, which implies (via intended physical interpretation) that ∅ 6= extSE 6=
US . Hence, one cannot conclude, as in CM, that (Pf ,⊆) is a Boolean lattice.
Moreover, there are properties in QM that cannot be simultaneously tested.
Thus, neither assumption CMT holds, and one cannot assert that the sets PfT
and Pf coincide. In order to discuss the order structure of (PfT ,⊆) in QM, let
us firstly introduce the symbols and notions that will be used in the following.
H: the Hilbert space on the complex field associated with Σ.
(L(H),⊆) (briefly, L(H)): the complete, orthomodular, atomic lattice (which
also has the covering property; see, e.g., Beltrametti and Cassinelli, 1981, Ch.
10) of all closed subspaces of H.
⊥, ⋓ and ⋒: the orthocomplementation, the meet and the join, respectively,
defined on L(H).
A: the set of all atoms (one-dimensional subspaces) of L(H).
ϕ: the bijective mapping S −→ A of all (pure) states on the atoms of L(H).
χ: the bijective mapping E −→ L(H) of all properties on the closed subspaces
of L(H).
≺ : the order on E canonically induced, via χ, by the order defined on L(H).
⊥: the orthocomplementation on E canonically induced, via χ, by the ortho-
complementation defined on L(H).
The mapping χ is an order isomorphism of (E ,≺) onto (L(H),⊆) that pre-
serves the orthocomplementation, hence (E ,≺) also is a complete, orthomodular,
atomic lattice. We call it the lattice of properties of Σ, and identify it with a
(standard, sharp) QL. We then introduce a further mapping
θ: E ∈ E −→ SE = {S ∈ S | ϕ(S) ⊆ χ(E)} ∈ P(S)
(where P(S) denotes the power set of S) that associates every property E ∈ E
with the set of states that are represented by atoms included in the subspace
χ(E). Let L(S) be the range of θ. It is easy to see that also (L(S),⊆) is a lattice,
isomorphic to (E ,≺) and (L(H),⊆). We still denote by ⊥ the orthocomplemen-
tation on (L(S),⊆) canonically induced, via θ, by the orthocomplementation ⊥
defined on (E ,≺), and call (L(S),⊆) the lattice of all ⊥-closed subsets of S (for,
if SE ∈ L(S), (S⊥E )
⊥ = SE).
The interpretations of (E ,≺) and (L(H),⊆) then suggest identifying L(S)
with the subset of all p-testable propositions. This can be formalized by intro-
ducing the following assumption.
QMT. Let α(x) ∈ ΦT (x), and let Eα ∈ E be such that α(x) ≡ Eα(x). Then,
the physical proposition pfα of α(x) coincides with SEα in QM.
Assumption QMT has some relevant immediate consequences. In particular,
it implies that the equivalence relations ≡ and ≈ coincide on ΦT (x).4 Indeed,
note firstly that the bijectivity of the mapping χ entails that two properties E,
F ∈ E coincide iff they are represented by the same subspace of L(H), hence iff
4The coincidence of ≡ and ≈ suggests that also the logical preorder < and the physical
preorder ≺ may coincide on ΦT (x) in QM. Indeed, this coincidence has been introduced as an
assumption within the general formulation of the SR interpretation of QM (see Garola and
Solombrino, 1996a). However, we do not need this assumption in the present paper.
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SE = SF . Secondly, consider the wffs α(x), β(x) ∈ ΦT (x) and let Eα, Eβ ∈ E
be such that α(x) ≡ Eα(x) and β(x) ≡ Eβ(x). Then, the following sequence of
coimplications holds because of assumption QMT,
α(x) ≈ β(x) iff Eα(x) ≈ Eβ(x) iff pfα = p
f
β iff SEα = SEβ iff
Eα = Eβ iff Eα(x) ≡ Eβ(x) iff α(x) ≡ β(x),
which proves our statement.
More important for our aims in this paper, assumption QMT implies that
the poset (PfT ,⊆) of all p-testable physical propositions associated with wffs of
ΦT (x) (equivalently, with elementary wffs of Φ(x)) can be identified in QM with
the lattice (L(S),⊆) of all ⊥-closed subsets of S. Hence the posets (ΦT (x)/ ≈,≺)
and (PfT ,⊆), on one side, and the lattices (L(S),⊆), (L(H),⊆) and (E ,≺), on
the other side, are order-isomorphic, and the isomorphisms preserve the ortho-
complementation (on (L(S),⊆), (L(H),⊆) and (E ,≺)) or canonically induce it
(on (ΦT (x)/ ≈,≺) and (P
f
T ,⊆)). We therefore denote orthocomplementation,
meet and join in all these lattices by the same symbols (that is, ⊥, ⋓ and ⋒,
respectively). Then, one can easily show that, for every α(x), β(x) ∈ ΦT (x),
S\pfα ⊇ (p
f
α)
⊥ ∈ PfT ,
pfα ∩ p
f
β = p
f
α ⋓ p
f
β ∈ P
f
T ,
pfα ∪ p
f
β ⊆ p
f
α ⋒ p
f
β ∈ P
f
T .
We can now state our main result in this section. Indeed, the isomorphisms
above allow one to recover (standard, sharp) QL as a quotient algebra of wffs
of L(x), identifying it with (ΦT (x)/ ≈,≺). We stress that this identifica-
tion has required four nontrivial steps: (i)selecting p-testable wffs inside Φ(x);
(ii)grouping p-testable wffs into classes of physical rather than logical equiva-
lence; (iii)adopting assumption QMT; (iv)identifying (L(S),⊆) and (E ,≺).
The above result shows how the non-Boolean lattice of QL can be obtained
without giving up classical semantics, which was our minimal aim in this paper.
However, we have already seen in the Introduction that it has a deeper meaning
if one accepts the SR interpretation of QM. Yet, it must be noted that no
direct correspondence can be established between the logical operations on Φ(x)
and the lattice operations of QL. By comparing the relations established in
Sec. 3 and the relations above, one gets indeed that, for every α(x), β(x),
γ(x) ∈ ΦT (x),
α(x) ≡ ¬β(x) implies pfα ⊆ S\p
f
β ⊇ (p
f
β)
⊥,
α(x) ≡ β(x) ∧ γ(x) implies pfα = p
f
β ∩ p
f
γ = p
f
β ⋓ p
f
γ ,
α(x) ≡ β(x) ∨ γ(x) implies pfα ⊇ p
f
β ∪ p
f
γ ⊆ p
f
β ⋒ p
f
γ
(see also Garola and Sozzo, 2006).
7 The quantum language LTQ(x)
The set ΦT (x) generally is not closed with respect to ¬, ∧ and ∨, in the sense
that negation, meet and join of testable wffs may be not testable. However, we
can construct a language LTQ(x) whose wffs are testable and whose connectives
correspond to lattice operations of QL, as follows.
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(i) Let us take ΦT (x) (equivalently, the set E(x) of all elementary wffs of
Φ(x)) as set of elementary wffs, and introduce three new connectives ¬Q, ∧Q
and ∨Q(quantum negation, quantum meet and quantum join, respectively) and
standard formation rules for quantum well formed formulas (briefly, qwffs).
(ii) Let ΦTQ(x) be the set of all qwffs and let us define an assigment function
τρS on ΦTQ(x) based on the assigment function σ
ρ
S defined on Φ(x). To this end,
let us consider the wffs α(x), β(x) ∈ ΦT (x) and let Eα, Eβ ∈ E be such that
α(x) ≡ Eα(x) and β(x) ≡ Eβ(x). Then, for every ρ ∈ R and S ∈ S, we put
τρS(α(x)) = σ
ρ
S(α(x)),
τρS(¬Qα(x)) = t (or f) iff σ
ρ
S(E
⊥
α (x)) = t (or f),
τρS(α(x) ∧Q β(x)) = t (or f) iff σ
ρ
S((Eα ⋓ Eβ)(x)) = t (or f),
τρS(α(x) ∨Q β(x)) = t (or f) iff σ
ρ
S((Eα ⋒ Eβ)(x)) = t (or f).
It is apparent that ¬Qα(x), α(x) ∧Q β(x) and α(x) ∨Q β(x) are logically
equivalent to wffs of ΦT (x). Therefore the above semantic rules can be applied
recursively by considering α(x), β(x) ∈ ΦTQ(x), which defines τ
ρ
S on ΦTQ(x).
Hence, the notions of logical preorder < and logical equivalence ≡ can be ex-
tended to ΦTQ(x), and every qwff is logically equivalent to a wff of E (x) (hence
of ΦT (x)).
(iii) Let us associate a physical sentence (∀x)α(x) with every qwff α(x) ∈
ΦTQ(x). Hence the notions of certainly true, physical preorder ≺ and physical
equivalence ≈ can be introduced on ΦTQ(x). Furthermore ≡ and ≈ coincide on
ΦTQ(x), since they coincide on ΦT (x) (Sec. 6).
(iv) For every α(x) ∈ ΦTQ(x), let us define the physical proposition pfα =
{S ∈ S |α(x) is certainly true in S} of α(x). Then, the set of all physical
propositions associated with qwffs of ΦTQ(x) coincides with P
f
T . Moreover,
the semantic rules established above entail that, for every α(x), β(x), γ(x) ∈
ΦTQ(x),
α(x) ≡ ¬Qβ(x) iff pfα = (p
f
β)
⊥,
α(x) ≡ β(x) ∧Q γ(x) iff pfα = p
f
β ⋓ p
f
γ ,
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α(x) ≡ β(x) ∨Q γ(x) iff pfα = p
f
β ⋒ p
f
γ .
(The proof of these coimplications is straightforward if one preliminarily notices
that, for every E, F ∈ E the physical propositions of E⊥(x), (E ⋓ F )(x) and
(E⋒F )(x) are (pfE)
⊥, pfE⋓p
f
F and p
f
E⋒p
f
F , respectively, because of the definitions
of ⊥, ⋓ and ⋒ on E and assumption QMT).
We have thus constructed a language LTQ(x) whose connectives correspond
to lattice operations on QL, as desired. It must be stressed, however, that the
semantic rules for quantum connectives have an empirical character since they
depend on the empirical relations on the set of all properties, and that these
rules coexist with the semantic rules for classical connectives in our approach.
5Note that, if α(x), β(x) ∈ ΦT (x), the second implication at the end of Sec. 6 shows that
the physical proposition of α(x)∧β(x) is identical to the physical proposition of α(x)∧Q β(x),
which implies α(x)∧β(x) ≈ α(x)∧Qβ(x). Yet, one cannot assert in this case that α(x)∧β(x) ≡
α(x)∧Q β(x), since α(x)∧β(x) does not necessarily belong to ΦT (x). The difference between
∧ and ∧Qwas overlooked in a recent paper (Garola and Sozzo, 2006), and we thank S. Sozzo
for bringing such issue to our attention.
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Finally, we note that, for every α(x), β(x) ∈ ΦTQ(x), the following logical
equivalence can be proved,
α(x) ∨Q β(x) ≡ ¬Q((¬Qα(x)) ∧Q (¬Qβ(x))),
and a quantum implication connective →Q can be introduced such that
α(x)→Q β(x) ≡ (¬Qα(x)) ∨Q (α(x) ∧Q β(x)).
The formal structure of the above logical equivalences is well known in QL.
The novelty here is that α(x) and β(x) are sentences referring to individual
samples of physical objects, while the wffs of standard QL represent propositions
and do not bear this interpretation.
8 Quantum truth
The notion of true with certainty is defined in Sec. 2 for all wffs of L∗(x). Yet,
only testable wffs of L∗(x) can be associated with empirical procedures that
allow one to check whether they are certainly true or not.
For the sake of simplicity, let us restrict here to the sublanguage L(x) of
L∗(x) and to the subset ΦT (x) ⊆ Φ∗T (x) of p-testable wffs (Sec. 4). Then, the
notion of certainly true can be worked out in QM in order to define a notion of
quantum truth (briefly, Q-truth) on ΦT (x), as follows.
QT. Let α(x) ∈ ΦT (x) and S ∈ S. We put
α(x) is Q-true in S iff S ∈ pfα,
α(x) is Q-false in S iff S ∈ (pfα)
⊥,
α(x) has no Q-truth value in S iff S ∈ S\pfα ∪ (p
f
α)
⊥.
Bearing in mind our definitions and results in Secs. 3, 4 and 6, we get
α(x) is Q-true in S iff α(x) is certainly true in S iff (∀x)α(x) is true
in S iff Eα(x) is certainly true in S iff (∀x)Eα(x) is true in S.
The notion of Q-false has not yet an interpretation at this stage. However,
we get from its definition
α(x) is Q-false in S iff E⊥α (x) is certainly true in S iff (∀x)E
⊥
α (x) is
true in S.
Let us remind now that, for every E ∈ E , the property denoted by E⊥ is usu-
ally interpreted in the physical literature as the equivalence class of registering
devices obtained by reversing the roles of the outcomes 1 and 0 in all register-
ing devices in E (we stress that we are considering properties here, not generic
effects). This suggests one to add the following assumption to our scheme.
QMN. Let E ∈ E . Then, E⊥(x) ≡ ¬E(x).
Assumption QMN implies
α(x) is Q-false in S iff (∀x)¬Eα(x) is true in S iff (∀x)¬α(x) is true
in S iff ¬α(x) is certainly true in S,
hence we say that α(x) is certainly false in S iff it is Q-false in S.
The above terminology implies that α(x) has no Q-truth value in S iff α(x)
is neither certainly true nor certainly false in S. We also say in this case that
α(x) is Q-indeterminate in S.
13
It is now apparent that the notions of truth and Q-truth coexist in our ap-
proach. This realizes an integrated perspective, according to which the classical
and the quantum notions of truth are not incompatible. Our approach also ex-
plains the “metaphysical disaster” mentioned in the Introduction (Randall and
Foulis, 1983) as following from attributing truth values that refer to quantified
wffs of a first order predicate calculus to open wffs of the calculus itself.
Let us conclude our paper with some additional remarks.
Firstly, the notion of Q-truth introduced above applies to a fragment only
(the set ΦT (x) ⊆ Φ(x)) of the language L(x). If one wants to introduce this
notion on the set of all wffs of a suitable quantum language, one can refer to
the language LTQ(x) constructed in Sec. 7. Then, all qwffs are testable, and
definition QT can be applied in order to define Q-truth on LTQ(x) by simply
substituting ΦTQ(x) to ΦT (x) in it. Again, classical truth and Q-truth can
coexist on LTQ in our approach.
Secondly, definition QT can be physically justified by observing that most
manuals and books on the foundations of QM introduce (usually implicitly) a
verificationist notion of truth that can be summarized in our present terms as
follows.
QVT. Let α(x) ∈ Φ(x) and S ∈ S. Then, α(x) is true (false) in S iff:
(i) α(x) is testable;
(ii) α(x) can be tested and found to be true (false) on a physical object in
the state S without altering S.
It can be proved that the notion of truth introduced by definition QVT and
the notion of Q-truth introduced by definition QT coincide. The proof is rather
simple but requires some use of the theoretical apparatus of QM (Garola and
Sozzo, 2004).
Finally, a further justification of definition QT can be given by noting that
the notion of true with certainty translates in our context the notion of certain,
or true, introduced in some partially axiomatized approaches to QM (as Piron’s,
1976).
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